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THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ORGANIZATION
LINDEN A. MANDER
I. TH LEGAL PROFESSION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Within recent years the legal profession has shown remarkable activity in the study of international relations. At Bar Association meetings,
resolutions have been adopted; members of the bench and bar have
associated themselves with important movements and pronouncements;
and international organizations comprising lawyers and judges have
borne witness to the widening sphere of interest and action on the part
of those to whom law and order make a peculiarly immediate appeal
in view of their training and professional activity. The few examples
which will be given may serve as justification for an attempt to summarize a number of important developments which have recently taken
place, and proposals which have been made in the field of international
law and organization.
The Inter-American Bar Association was organized in May, 1940,
at the conclusion of the Eighth American Scientific Congress. The first
conference of the Association was held in Havana, Cuba, March 24-28,
1941, the proceedings of which have been published in two volumes,
one in Spanish, the other in English. A meeting of the council and
committees of the Inter-American Bar Association was held in Washington, D. C., November 19-21, 1942, and was attended by over 150
leaders of the bar. It received reports from commissions dealing with
international and comparative law, immigration and naturalization and
citizenship, industrial property, trusts and trustees, civil status of persons, taxation, administrative law and procedure, customs legislation,
commercial treaties, protection of intellectual property, legal documentation, legal education; it also set up additional committees on comparative constitutional law, comparative civil and commercial law, communications, industrial, economic and social legislation, penal law and
procedure, 'and the study of ocean fisheries.- The second general conference, which was held in Rio de Janeiro on August 7-12, 1943, worked
2
through nineteen committees and passed approximately 120 resolutions.
The third conference was held in Mexico City July 31-August 8, 1944,
and was attended by 500 delegates representing 62 member associations.8 Important resolutions were adopted, especially in the field of
legal education, communications, and post-war problems. It was agreed
IWilliam R. Vallance, Post-War Plans of the Inter-Americas Bar As-

soclatio-n (1943) 37 Azv. T.I=. L. 106-115.
2William

Roy Vallance, Inter-American Bar Association Holds Interesting Meeting at Rio de Jane ro (1943) 37 Aavr 3. IT. L. 666-668.
George A. Finch, Mexico Meeting of the Inter-American Bar Association (1944) 38 Am, J. INT. L. 686-687. (The Fourth Conference was scheduled to meet at Santiago, Chile, Oct. 20-29, 1945. See William Roy Valiance,
The IZnter-American Lawyers Meet (1945) 39 A.m. 3. INT. L. 555-559.)
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that law schools should encourage the study of English in Latin America
and the study of French, Spanish or Portuguese in North America in
preparation for law courses, that law courses include the study of comparative American government and comparative constitutional history.
The section dealing with communications recommended the implementation of the Lima conference recommendation that a permanent American Aeronautical Commission be established to study ways in which
obstacles to traffic might be eliminated, also that an Inter-American
tele-communication conference be held as soon as possible. It gave
attention to problems of general international organization and urged
that the Permanent Court of International Justice have compulsory
jurisdiction over all juridical disputes between states and that the jurisdiction of the Court be broadened as much as possible.
Of great importance has been the establishment of the Inter-American
Academy of Comparative and International Law which, after much
preliminary work, announced that the first academic courses were to
be given at Havana, January 8-15, 1945. Students were to register
personally or by mail before December 31, 1944. They must be graduates of a law school or a political science school of a Latin American
republic or hold an LLB, A.B., or B.S. degree in political science,
public law, government, or Latin American relations from an institution
of the United States or Canada. The government of Cuba has made
the academy an official corporation, provided an initial appropriation
of $5,000, and has promised an annual sum of $12,000. The InterAmerican Bar Association intends to publicize the importance of the
academy and requests assistance for its activities; it has also officially
thanked the government of Cuba for its valuable help.4
We may well hope that the academy will prove a valuable instrument
in broadening the basis of international legal cooperation and strengthening the bonds between members of the legal profession in the 21
countries.
The Bar Association of the United States has taken a lively interest
in recent international developments. 5 Its sub-committee drew up a
report on post-war international judicial organization which was adopted
at the meeting in Chicago in September, 1944. The Association resolved
that a permanent court of international justice should be continued "as
the highest tribunal of an acceptable system of inter-related permanent
international courts with an obligatory jurisdiction." Of especial interest
is the proposal that the court should be so organized that a member
' George A. Finch, Inter-American Academy of Comparative and International Law (1944) 38 Am. J. INr. L. 688-689.
5 See, for example: Edward A. Allen, Work of the International and
ComparativeLaw Section of the American Bar Association (1943) 37 AazL
J. INT. L. 660-663; and Mitchell B. Carroll, Post-War International Organization and the Work of the Section of Internationaland Comparative Law
of the American Bar Association (1945) 39 Amw.3. INr. L. 20-34.
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would be available to sit as an international circuit court with regional
jurisdiction to hold regular terms in the capital of each nation. Each
of these circuit courts should include one or more international commissioners to sit in an advisory capacity. Thus the Bar Association
contemplated the establishment of some 60 "regularly available" international circuit courts of original jurisdiction. The significance of this
resolution will be discussed later in this article.
The American and Canadian Bar Associations" each created special
committees to consider the questions of law and the administration of
justice involved in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The two associations coordinated their activities and submitted a number of questions
to 25 regional conferences of lawyers, 18 in the United States and 7 in
Canada.
As the CanadianBar Review puts it, a remarkable agreement of views
was registered by more than 600 judges, teachers and those practicing
the law. Every group agreed on the importance of an International
Court of Justice and favored retaining the present statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice with certain modifications
rather than attempting to introduce a new statute. The groups pointed
out that the Permanent Court had already rendered important verdicts
in 65 cases to the general satisfaction of the world, and that several
instruments had been signed conferring jurisdiction on the court,
whereas the preparation of a new statute might reopen many issues
which have satisfactorily been settled. The regional groups found in
favor of continuing advisory opinions and unanimously agreed that the
"court should be given the power to create regional or special chambers,
as need may be shown to exist." Since the court's chamber for summary
procedure had given but two judgments and its chamber for labor cases
and that for communications and transit have never been called upon,
it would appear desirable to leave the precise type of chamber which
may be needed to the power of the court itself. The groups favored the
continuance of selecting a judge ad hoc when the elected judges included
no person of a nationality of the party before the court.
The groups also favored a broadened jurisdiction of the court, hoping
that all states parties to the charter would confer on the court jurisdiction over their legal disputes. The groups favored retaining the provision in Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice which "defines the classes of legal disputes to which the
compulsory jurisdiction which may be conferred would be applicable.
It was recognized that this definition furnishes no test of adjudicability.
It merely delimits the conferred jurisdiction. Although the experience
today has not been extensive, it has seemed to indicate that the definition is not unsatisfactory for that purpose."8
6The InternationaZ Court of the United Nations Organization (1944) 22
CAN. B. REv. 305.
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The groups almost unanimously agreed that in the existing state of
international law, "the determination of the existence of aggression is
a political question." They unanimously agreed that the charter should
contain a provision "looking toward the enforcement of judgments of
the Court if compliance were refused or withheld," and that the Security
Council should be given the power to take such action as it might deem
desirable in such an event. Without indicating the matter in detail,
the regional groups recognized the need of broadening both scope and
authority of international law.
Representatives of the American Bar Association met with members
of the State Department in a series of meetings to discuss the resolutions
adopted by the House of Delegates on September 15, 1944. The Association urged the strengthening of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and
was named as one of the consultant organizations entitled to representation at the San Francisco Conference.
An editorial in the American Bar Association Journal strongly supported Senator Wayne Morse's resolution (Senate Resolution A-160),
introduced in the Senate July 28, that the United States accept the obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice provided for
in the San Francisco Charter. "Faced with our present responsibility,
it is not enough for us to utter platitudes ... We have passed beyond
the stage of generalities . . . Let us declare a holiday on inaction. ' 7
Recent legal periodicals contain many admirable articles dealing with
the question of World Organization, as well as book reviews devoted
to works of international significance, sufficient indeed to indicate the
widespread interest of the Bench and Bar in the most urgent question
which confronts mankind today-World Order.

II. THE LEAGUE or NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS BASED
UPON THE ASsOcIATIvE PRINCIPLE
At the end of World War I the victorious powers established the
League of Nations in an attempt to prevent war and to build an
effective world order. Its machinery comprised a Council, an Assembly,
a Secretariat; closely connected with it were the Permanent Court of
International Justice and the International Labor Organization. Its
underlying principles may be summarized: (1) War was a matter of
concern to all states-a sovereign nation, while retaining the power
to make war, was to do so within a community of nations which were
to decide upon the legitimacy of the action. Although member states did
not renounce their sovereignty they were supposed to use that sovereignty in a restrained manner. (2) Disputes likely to lead to war must
7The Morse Revolution (1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 466. Pass the Morse

Resolution Now, 39 A. B. A. J. 574: "It remains to be seen how long this

country will continue to take part in the setting up of the Court and the
selection of the judges without itself accepting the basic jurisdiction of the
Court."
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be settled by peaceful means. (3) Member states would join in imposing
sanctions against a nation which went to war in violation of its obligations under the Covenant. (4) Provision for peaceful change was contained in Article Xiv, in Articles XI, XIV, and XV, and also in (5)
the establishment of social and economic conditions through appropriate
international agencies which would help obviate the causes of the war.
Unfortunately, the League suffered from several weaknesses. The
rule of unanimity, though somewhat modified in practice, still bore witness to the unreadiness of nations to surrender their sovereignty and
helped to prevent effective action. The uncertain nature of sanctions
arose from the fact that the League could only "recommend" to its
members the amount of military, naval, or air forces which each should
contribute. No clear definition of the word "war" existed and nations
could take refuge in the traditional permission by international law
of forcible measures short of war-indeed, one might say that the League
prevented the word "war" but not war itself. Moreover, in the event
of a dispute, the League Council or Assembly had first to make exhaustive inquiries but had no power under the Covenant to prevent a
disputant from making troop movements or otherwise undertaking
warlike preparations and thereby aggravating the situation. Finally,
the United States refused, and some nations were uninvited, to join
the League, which resulted in a lack in universality of the League and,
perhaps even more important, the absence of membership of two great
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.
The attempts to strengthen the League need not be surveyed here.
Suffice it to say that they took the form first of regional proposals,
second of throwing the League machinery into operation before a dispute
reached breaking point, and third, of imposing sanctions by two-thirds
vote, which sanctions were to be employed against a country presumed
to be undertaking preparations foi aggressive purposes. These attempts
broke down and the world moved into a second war after a period of
twenty years.
The proposals set forth at Dumbarton Oaks and (in the security
provisions) substantially adopted at San Francisco, mark in some
respects an improvement over the League of Nations; in other ways
they appear to be a retrogression. The advances include: (1) The
principle of unanimity no longer holds. Major decisions can be made
by two-thirds vote and procedural decisions by majority vote (except
in the all-important veto power of the Big Five which, in the opinion
of many people, leaves Hamlet out of the play). From the point of
view of "international legislation," the new voting procedures will enable
conventions dealing with social, financial, and economic questions to
be dealt with much more expeditiously. (2) The Charter provides for
concerted action against a country which uses "force" or "the threat
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of force." The United Nations may move against a would-be aggressor
before that country reaches the stage of waging war. Indeed the word
"war" does not appear in the Charter and to that degree collective
action takes on a preventive character not realized in the Covenant.
(3) The signatory powers agree to create an international military
commission and special air contingents to be put at the disposal of the
United Nations, and to act upon the call of the Security Council for
other forces. (The League Council, it will be recalled, could only recommend military sanctions.) To this extent, the world community will
have more force at its disposal than did the League of Nations; we
shall have to await the organization of this force to see whether it will
be effective or not. (4) The Charter provides for the integration of the
International Court of Justice with the other United Nations agencies
and thereby obviates many awkward problems raised twenty-odd years
ago by the need of separate adhesions to the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice; (5) Social and economic machinery is
more adequately provided for; (6) the Charter is not tied to the Peace
Treaties as was the League of Nations.
On the other hand, in the Covenant no final right of veto existed
even for the big powers, for under Article XV, which dealt with disputes of a serious character, the votes of the two disputants did not
count. Thus the San Francisco Charter seems to have lost ground in the
matter of the veto. Also, the member states retain their "sovereign
equality." Whether this means full sovereignty or not, time alone can
tell.8 (In practice, the Charter has already denied the sovereign equality of states by giving a predominant legal position to the Big Five.)
We may summarize by saying that international society today has
recognized the need of having more continuous cooperation in preparing
international conventions of a "quasi-legislative" character and in taking
steps against a possible aggressor than after 1919; it has made more
rapid action possible against the majority of the powers of the world,
but at the expense of appearing to exempt the great powers who claim
that, since they have the responsibility of enforcing peace, they must
s One may well regret the inclusion of the phrase "Sovereign equality"
in the United Nations Charter. Except for a reference to sovereignty over
certain colonies, the term is not used in the League of Nations Covenant.
The remarks of J. L. Brierly are much to the point:
"In the original theory it was not the state that was sovereign, but a
person or persons within a state that were sovereign over the rest...
"Unfortunately for the clearness of our thinking on political matters,
the hold of sovereignty on the imagination was so strong that instead of
formulating a new theory, political science merely tried to adapt the old
theory to new conditions ....
We may properly speak of states as 'independent' in the sense to be explained later; but it is meaningless to say that
they are 'sovereign,' that is to say, superior, when we are speaking of their
relations to one another....
"The theory of sovereignty . . . is not only inconsistent with the subjection of states to any kind of law, but it is in fact an impossible theory
for a world which contains more states than one." J. L. BRaiELY, THE LAw
OF NATIONS, Oxford University Press (2d. ed. 1936) pp. 36-39.
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have the major decisions, although it is these very major powers which
constitute the great threat to world peace.
This great political contradiction does 'not constitute the only hazard.
Underlying legal theories and practices provide another source of grave
disquietude, and it is the purpose of this article to examine some questions which are involved under this heading.
I.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BINDING CHARACTER OF
TREATIES
The Charter of the United Nations must be examined in the light of
two doctrines which cannot easily (if indeed, at all) be reconciled: The
sovereignty of nations on one hand and the binding character of treaties
on the other. While the Charter does not, as did the League of Nations
Covenant, contain provisions for the withdrawal of members and to
that degree may be regarded as a more binding instrument than the
Covenant, if it is merely the expression of a number of sovereign wills,
if it embodies merely the principle of association, then the nations which
have signed it may exercise their soverign will to ignore it or to refuse
to carry out their duties under its provisions. If, however, the legal
obligations are paramount, then, in fact if not in theory, there has been
a limitation placed upon the extent of the exercise of sovereignty.
Now the Charter contains explicit reference to the sovereign equality of
the members of the United Nations and to this degree appears to
consecrate the principle of associative action: the Charter is not a constitution for the world; and it appears to contain the two irreconcilable
principles mentioned above. The question arises whether this contradiction can safely be permitted to continue.
Up to the time of the League of Nations, there was no "system of
legal precedence whereby treaty obligations" might "be set into their
relative order." Consequently a treaty signed by a nation inconsistent
with an earlier treaty was deemed to be non-binding to the extent of its
inconsistency; and during the Ethiopian crisis in 1935 Professor
Borchard argued that if the United States placed an embargo on exports
of oil to Italy because of the latter's violation of the Kellogg Pact, the
embargo would violate a long standing commercial treaty between the
9
Much, of course, will depend upon the definition of sovereignty. Curiously enough, in a later volume, Brierly asserts that the "modern conception of the sovereignty or independence of states is not inconsistent with
their subordination to law," and that those who claim absolute and illimitable sovereignty for states do so by a priori reasoning and by adopting
"a thoroughly unscientific method of approach" which is much like "trying
to explain human nature by studying the behaviour of Robinson Crusoe
before the arrival on the scene of Man Friday." (J. L. B~ai-ny, THE OurLOOK FOR I.TRmmATIONAL LAW, Oxford University Press, 1944, pp. 3-4.)
Despite these and many similar observations which could be quoted, the
situation which obtains in present-day international relations is that which
is described above. Indeed, Brierly recognizes the position when he writes

that "International Law is still very definitely in the laissez faire of social
development." Ibid. p. 11.
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United States and Italy. On this view a minor treaty was deemed to
have as much weight as a comprehensive international instrument. This
incident reveals the significance of Lauterpacht's suggestion that nations
should write into a comprehensive treaty a general principle of law
with explicitly expressed attributes of superiority over any other contractual obligation present or future. 0 Such a step appeared to have
been taken by the nations which signed the League of Nations Covenant; under Article 20 the members agreed that the Covenant was
to be accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se
which were inconsistent with the terms thereof. They solemnly undertook that they would not thereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the Covenant and that they would take immediate steps to
procure release from any exising inconsistent obligations. This undertaking did not amount to a constitutional limitation for, in addition to
the provision for withdrawal from the League on the part of dissatisfied nations, if states did not take steps to abrogate inconsistent
obligations presumably the obligations would still be binding; as Wild
noted, no powers under Article 20 of the Covenant were given to the
League "to bring about the termination of treaty commitments of this
character."" In a word, the League Covenant did not bridge the gap
between the two principles-the paramountcy of legal obligations and
the sovereignty of member states.
It would appear that the Charter of the United Nations has made
an advance over the League of Nations Covenant in this respect. No
provision is made for withdrawal from the organization, though expulsion is possible. As with the League, so under Article 102 of the
Charter, member states undertake to register with the Secretariat all
treaties and international agreements entered into after the Charter
comes into force. Article 103 states: "In the event of a conflict between
the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present
charter and any other international obligations to which they are
subject, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."
This appears to be a more binding text than Article 20 of the League
Covenant and to this degree perhaps begins the creation of a system
of legal precedence and of a system of world constitutionalism. But it
is more than doubtful whether the Charter is sufficiently the "higher
law" in the sense that a national constitution is a higher law than laws
passed by a national legislature. First, the veto power of the Big Five
appears to provide a big loophole, and second, no international agency
is given final power to say whether a conflict of obligations exists and
if so what action must be taken. This question requires further exam10 H. Lauterpacht, The Covenant as the "Higher Law" (1936) BRT, Y. B.
INT. L. 54-65.
2"PAYSON S. WILD, SANCTIONS AND TaEATY ExFonczm=T, Harvard University Press, 1934, p. 7.
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ination, for it involves the problem of the relation of national constitutions to international treaties.
The United States has ratified the Charter of the United Nations
which thus becomes part of the supreme law of the land, but in case of
a conflict between the Charter and an act of Congress, is it certain that
the Charter would prevail? In the United States Circuit Court, District of Massachusetts, 1855,12 Mr. Justice Curtis held:
This provision of our Constitution has made treaties part of
our municipal law. But it has not assigned to them any particular degree of authority in our municipal law, nor declared
whether laws so enacted shall or shall not be paramount to
laws otherwise enacted. No such declaration is made, even in
respect to the Constitution itself. It is named in conjunction
with treaties and acts of Congress, as one of the supreme laws,
but no supremacy is in terms assigned to one over the other.
The learned judge then went on:
There is therefore nothing in the mere fact that a treaty is a
law, which would prevent Congress from repealing it. Unless it
is for some reason distinguishable from other laws, the rule
which it gives may be displaced by the legislative power, at
its pleasure...
To refuse to execute a treaty, for reasons which approve
themselves to the conscientious judgment of the nation, is a
matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy; but the power to
do so is a prerogative of which no nation can be deprived
without deeply affecting its independence. That the people of
the United States have deprived their government of this power
in any case, I do not believe. That it must reside somewhere
and be applicable to all cases, I am convinced. I feel no doubt,
that it belongs to Congress.
Many decisions, of which one only will be noted here, confirm this
doctrine that if a treaty and an act of Congress are inconsistent, the
later one prevails. In U. S. v. Thompson (1919)'18 it was held that
"there is no principle of law more firmly established by the highest
court of the land than that while a treaty will supersede a prior act
of Congress, an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty. The
latest expression controls

. . ."

Ex-President Taft, writing in 1916,14

asserted that:
A sovereign nation, though it makes a treaty, has the power
to break it, even though it be violating its plighted faith and
doing an immoral thing. If it could not, it would not be sovereign. Therefore, Congress may make a law which is binding on
the courts and on the people within its jurisdiction, though the
22 Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curt. 458-59; Fed. Cas. No. 13,799 (1855). See also,
inter alia, Swayne J.in The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall 616, 621, 20 L. Ed.
227 (1871); Harlan J.in Hijo v. U. S., 194 U. S. 315, 324; 24 Sup. Ct. in

727, 729; 48 L. Ed. 994 (1904).
13U.S. v. Thompson, 258 Fed. 257, 268 (E. D.Ark. 1919).
"W. H. TAT, THE PRESIDENCY, ITs DUTIEs, ITS PowRs,
C. Scribner's Sons, 1916.

ITS LnTATIONS,

ITS OPPoRTUNITIES,
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law violate a binding treaty ... To hold otherwise would be to
give a treaty, recognized as law under the Constitution, not
the force of law but the force of constitutional restriction."
Similar considerations govern the judiciaries of other countries. More
than that, it is uncertain how far decisions of the Permanent Court
of International Justice are binding upon national judiciaries. C. W.
Jenks in 1939 claimed that the assertion of an English judge that
decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice do not bind
the English courts was not necessarily sound and asserted that the
English courts should, under certain circumstances, hold themselves
bound by a World Court decision. 15 In addition, the courts have given
great weight to the construction of treaties .by the political or executive
arm of the government, which fact makes for uncertainty in the event
that two governments disagree as to the meaning of a treaty provision.
On the other hand, the Permanent Court of International Justice has
laid down that treaties are sources of legal obligation and may not be
interpreted restrictively by devices of municipal legislation. It upheld
the Minorities Treaties and opposed Poland's arguments which would
have minimized their effectiveness; it sustained the extended competence of the International Labor Organization against restrictive claims,
and in the Tunis and Morocco case it decided against the right of a
state to invoke the idea of domestic jurisdiction in order to nullify
international law. In several cases it decided that the uncertainty of
treaty obligations, owing to ambiguous wording, must be removed so
as to permit an effective observance of treaty provisions. In the case
of the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, the Court held that:
A state which has contracted valid international obligations
is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may
be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.16
And in the case of Polish Nationals in Danzig, it held that a state
might not:
advance as against another state its own Constitution with a
view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under internanational law or treaties in force.' 7
15
C. W. Jenks, The Authority in English Courts of Decisions of the
Permanent Court of Internutional Justice (1939) BRrr. Y. B. Irz. L. 1-36.

16 Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Opinion; Ser. 8,
No. 10, p. 20. See also P. C. I. J., Greco-Bulgarian Communities, Advisory
Opinion, July 30, 1930, Ser. B, No. 17, pp. 3-4: "It is a generally accepted
principle of international law that in the relations between Powers who are
contracting Parties to a treaty, the provisions, of municipal law cannot
prevail over those of the treaty."
2 P. C. I. J., The Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, Advisory
Opinion, Feb. 4, 1932, Ser. A/B, No. 44, p. 24. Also see the Free Zones case
where the court said: "France cannot rely on her own legislation to limit
the scope of her international obligations." However, the court in the
S. S. Wimbledon case (P. C. I. J., Ser. A, No. 1) argued that a treaty by

which a state undertook to perform or refrain from performing certain acts
did not constitute an abandonment of its sovereignty, though no doubt it
"places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the state"!
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We thus have the curious paradox that a national legislature may
pass an act repealing a treaty without thereby being relieved of its
obligations established by the treaty. Clearly much has to be done to
clarify the relations of national constitutions to the new international
order. Many constiutions were drawn up on days when "the major
problems originated within the national boundaries .. .Such a state
of affairs no longer holds." Today we witness the almost' continuous
impact of extra-national forces upon nations. International conferences
are becoming increasingly numerous, and constitutions "which make
difficult the effective execution of treaties dealing with matters which
vitally affect the daily welfare of national groups, are a hindrance and
not a help, and they should be revised in order to increase the common
national good which results from international cooperation as well as
fro minternal effort."' s
IV.

POLITICAL AND LEGAL MUTATIONS IN HISTORY

It is submitted that no effective advance will be made unless nations
and world society realize that by interpretation or by explicit rejection
the term sovereignty must lose the meaning attached to it by Austinian
jurists and by popular sentiments, and that new categories of thought
must replace those now holding sway in international relations. Indeed
we are at one of the turning points in history when events are outstripping the legal logic of those who confine their thinking to categories
which have become outmoded and who attempt to interpret a world
revolutionized by science in terms no longer adequate to encompass the
far-reaching changes. Such political and legal mutations have occurred
in the course of history, and they provide a valuable clue to the situation confronting the world today. A few examples will illustrate:
In feudal days, knights claimed and exercised the right of waging war
and diplomacy; in some areas a vague claim to overlordship existed,
but frequently it did not limit the practical independence of the knights.
In the course of time a prince extended his power, often by force of
arms, assumed the title of king and began to develop a law of treason,
so that war against him by another knight or prince c6nstituted not the
act of an independent ruler but the disaffected behavior of a subject.
A new, wider community had grown up, and the allegiance to the
smaller unit of government no longer was recognized as being absolute.
As one example among many, we may select the action of Henry VIII
of England who asserted that the Irish chiefs who fought to defend
their lands against the English monarch were not independent rulers
exercising a power of making war but were rebels who must forfeit
their land for taking up arms against one to whom they owed allegiance.
Now this was progress per saltum; the new law of treason involved a
'LnumEN A. MA=NER, FOUNDATIONS OF MODEN WoRL SocIETY, Stanford
University Press, 1941, p. 630.
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shift to another plane of political thought and value. It involved a
revolution of legal categories, a substitution of national for feudal
units of government, of national for feudal frames of legal reference.
The history of the decline of Papal power in European political life
illustrates the same question. For many generations the Papacy exercised a wide control over politics and claimed, inter alia, that treaties
must have the counter signature of the Pope in order to be valid. After
the treaty of Augsberg in 1555, the secular princes endeavored to free
themselves from this limitation upon their freedom of action. And in
the Treaties of Westphalia, 1648, they attempted by means of a long
detailed clause to make ineffective any protests against treaties signed
by secular princes but not countersigned by the Pope.19 Now, in strict
theory, even if Prince A signed a treaty with Prince B and both agreed
never again to invoke the signature of the Pope, it would have been
possible for either one, in the event that he wished to disavow the
treaty, to claim that the treaty was really not valid since it was logically
impossible to dispense with the signature of the Pope. Theoretically,
therefore, the princes could never become sovereign powers independent
of the Papal sanction; logically the sovereign states could not emerge
from the universal system represented by Papal control. The fact that
they did so constituted a political revolution in defiance of the logical
impossibility postulated by formal political theory.
We may also find examples of political mutations in more recent
times: When the thirteen American states declared their independence
from Great Britain, they became thirteen sovereign entities, and the
history of the next sixty or seventy years is a fascinating history
of the way in which these sovereign entities became one new state and
how they lost their previous sovereign prerogatives, though they retained certain "sovereign" rights under the new Constitution. Readers
will recall the doctrine of nullification and the writings of Calhoun,
whose logic, given his premises, was difficult to refute. But life proved
stronger than the old categories, and another advance was made per
saltum, a leap involving a tragic civil war. The transition to American
federalism from the Confederation carried with it a political mutation
similar in principle to the change made in the transition from feudal
units to the modem state.

20

Another illustration may be given. During the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, several of the British colonies, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand, and later South Africa and Ireland, attained dominion
status. In their struggle for self-government they won from the British
Parliament the right to rule themselves in many internal matters such

10 See CARL CONRAD ECKHARDT, THE PAPACY AND WORLD ArFArs, University
of Chicago Press, 1937.
20 There is no need to cite authorities for this section to members of the
American Bar.
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as land, tariffs, immigration, divorce, etc.; indeed soon after the American Revolution, the British Parliament agreed not to tax colonies
without their consent. However, legally speaking, what the British
Parliament had given, the British Parliament could take away. But
in the course of many years, the Dominion espoused the theory as
expressed by Sir Robert Borden that, while the British Parliament
might have the legal power, it did not possess the 'constitutionalright
to legislate in those matters which had come within the scope of Dominion legislative capacity. Nevertheless, there was implied a position of
subordination, for the Dominions had no international personality
and were bound by Great Britain's declaration of war in 1914. However,
in virtue of their contributions to the war effort, they asked for and
obtained seats at the Peace Conference, and later membership in the
League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and
the International Labor Organization. In order to give effect to the
new equality of status,'the Balfour Report was adopted in 1926 and
was translated into legal terms by the Statute of Westminster in 1931.21
The curious problems of legal theory which were raised can be read
in the debates of the Irish Dail where -the members differed as to
whether the Statute of Westminster passed by the British Parliament
could bind a later British Parliament in view of the legal omnipotence
of that body within the Empire.2 2 Mr. McGilligan claimed that the
declaration set forth in the 1930 Report of the Commonwealth Conference, "no act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the
commencement of this act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a
Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressed
and declared in that act that that Dominion has requested and consented to the enactment thereof," amounted to an act of renunciation
by the British Parliament to legislate for the members of the Commonwealth. But Mr. Lemass argued that it did nothing of the kind;
in his judgment the act had been "very carefully drafted to preserve
the- theoretical right of the British Parliament to legislate for the
whole of the British Empire." Indeed, he went on, the legal right of
1
2 The literature dealing with the legal problems raised b, the attainment of Dominion status is voluminous. Only a few works are cited here:
T. NoEL BAxER, JUmIDCAL STATus OF THE Barms DorvmaoNs n- INTERNATIONAL LAW, Longmans, 1929; P. E. ConBETT and H. A. SmnBa CANADA AD

P.

WoRLDa PoLrTIcs, Faber and Gwyer, 1928 ("If the difficulties of the theorist
were great before 1914, they have become insurmountable since the peace

treaties of 1919.", p. 108); H. DUNCAN HALL, Tan Brns CovovwoNWEALTH
OF NATIONS, 1920; C. M. MAcINNEs, Tim BRITIsH COMMONWEALTH AND ITS
UNSOLVED PROBLEMS, 1925; A. E. ZImMERN, THE TrD BrTIsH EMunw, 1926;
R. B. STEWART, TREATY RELATIONs OF TiE BRITISH CoMMoNwEALTH OF NAToNs,
Macmillan, 1939, and the many works of Professor A. B. Keith. For an
interesting analysis of the role of the Crown, see address by Right Hon. L.
S. Amery, Nov. 30, 1926, in appendix XII, A. L. LowLL and H. D. HALL,
Tan BRrnsH ComioNwEA.LTH Or NATIONs, World Peace Foundation, 1927.
22 A. B. KEnm (ed.), SPEEcsES An DocuMEa'Ts ON Tm BRzIsa Dorimzoxs
1918-1931, Oxford University Press, n.d., pp. 231-302.
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the British Parliament to legislate for the British Empire "is not destroyed." "What one British Parliament has enacted, another British
Parliament can repeal, and the position will be that, at any time, by
simply repealing that act, the British Parliament can reassert its right
to legislate for this state or another of the Dominions without the consent of the Parliament of this state or of that Dominion." Mr. McGilligan in reply quoted General Hertzog to the effect that if there was
ever any question of a British Parliament repealing the Statute of
Westminster, "the moment that repeal is concluded the whole Commonwealth of Nations would be broken up. There would be precedent for
secession all over the Commonwealth if and when that happened."
In other words, Mr. McGilligan had to introduce a non-legal argument, claiming in effect that Great Britain would not dare to attempt
to exercise its theoretical power. In strict logic Mr. Lemass probably
had the better of the verbal exchange, since, if the British Parliament
was legally omnipotent, what it could give at one time it could take
back at another within the British Commonwealth. Only if it agreed to
the sovereign independence of the Dominions as it had agreed to the
sovereign independence of the thirteen American colonies would the
control be definitely broken. Such was the dilemma posed if the discussion were kept in terms of strict sovereignties. It is interesting to
note that Mr. Winston Churchill feared that if the Statute of Westminster were passed and the Dominions were given full legislative
power, there would be nothing to prevent the Irish Dail from abolishing
the oath to the king and abolishing the limits placed upon Ireland's
freedom of action by the 1921 Articles of Agreement. As events turned
out, while Mr. Lemass scored a triumph in purely logical debate, Mr.
Churchill saw more clearly the general development of events, for the
Irish Free State, under de Valera, did the things which Mr. Churchill
had anticipated and used its new status inter alia to maintain neutrality
by the Foreign Offices.
Once again we see the logic of restricted categories giving way to the
logic of history, for the Dominions now are recognized as independent
nations within the world community, though bound by special ties of
sentiment and interests to Great Britain and to one another. Their
development has played havoc with traditional theories of sovereignty
and the legal omnipotence of the British Parliament. And today we
are witnessing another remarkable development involving a legal mutation of a far-reaching character. It is found in the statement of Mr.
Justice Jackson, chief of the counsel of the United States in the prosecution of Axis war criminals, who has enunciated a most challenging
23

doctrine.
23 91 CoNc. REC., June 14, 1945, A 3089-3092. Mr. Jackson, while AttorneyGeneral of the United States, foreshadowed the philosophy contained in this
report of the President in his address to the Inter-American Bar Associa-
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Justice Jackson pointed out that "international law as taught in the
nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century generally declared
that war-making was not illegal and is no crime at law," but went on
to say that unless "we are prepared to abandon every principle of
growth for internatioAal law, we cannot deny that our own day has its
right to institute customs and to conclude agreements that will themselves become sources of a newer and strengthened international law."
Since there is no continuously sitting international legislature, innovations and revisions come about by the action of independent governments designed to meet a change in circumstances. And Mr. Justice
Jackson confesses that he is "not disturbed by the lack of precedent
for the inquiry we propose to conduct," since when the Nazis came to
power "it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war
or the institution of war by treachery was illegal, and that the defense
of legitimate warfare was no longer available to those who engaged
in such an enterprise." He concluded "it is high time that we act on
the juridical principle that aggressive war making is-illegal and
criminal."
He then proceeds to argue that under the Kellogg Pact, states renounced war as an instrument of national policy and undertook to
settle disputes only by pacific means and condemned recourse to war
for the solution of international controversies. He quotes Mr. Stimson,
who in 1932 argued that the Briand-Kellogg Pact meant that war had
become illegal throughout practically the whole world and is no longer
to be the source and subject of rights. "It is an illegal thing." Mr.
Justice Jackson further cites the Geneva Protocol of 1924 in which
forty-eight governments declared "that a war of aggression constitutes
...an international crime" and the League of Nations resolution of
1927 that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime, and a
similar resolution passed at the Pan-American Conference in 1928.
One need not go into an elaborate discussion here to set forth the
arguments of those who may dispute Justice Jackson's interpretations
or who may argue that the above-mentioned treaties did not supplant
the power of national goverments under their own sovereignty to wage
war. Japan, and indeed several experts, disputed Mr. Stimson's interpretation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The Geneva Protocol of 1924
was adopted but Great Britain took the lead in rejecting it. Neither
does Justice Jackson deal with the extraordinarily difficult problem of
whether a Pan-American or a League resolution constituted a binding
obligation; whether sovereign states, by agreeing in principle that aggression constitutes an international crime, explicitly agree to renounce
tion meeting at Havana, March 27, 1941. See (1941) 35 Am. J. INT.L. 348-359.
See also, "The Law Above Nations," an address by Hon. Robert H. Jackson,
before the Inter-American Bar Association, Washington, D. C., Nov. 20, 1942,
(1943) 37 Am.J.INT. L. 297-305.
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their sovereign right of waging war; or whether any war which they
might wage under a Balance of Power system could be regarded as a
war of aggression. By interpertation it was agreed that the BriandKellogg Pact did not apply to wars waged in self-defense, and presumably in the coming trials the International Authority will have to
decide whether German, Italian and Japanese actions after 1939 did
constitute aggression in the light of all the evidence to be produced
by the Foreign Offices.
If the Allied powers do try the responsible authorities of Germany
and Japan for waging aggressive war on the ground that sufficient
international law exists to justify this action, even though the United
States did not join a League of Nations and even though the League of
Nations failed to take adequate action against Japan in 1931 and 1937
and Italy in 1933, they must so order the trials and systematize procedures and develop substantive law as to make it clear that this is
the newly established international order and that every future aggressor
will be regarded not as having made war as a sovereign state but as
having broken the peace of the world community. If they do less than
this, they will run the risk of merely cloaking political vengeance with
a thinly disguised veil of pseudo-legality. It will be worse than tragic
if such trials take place only to be followed by uncertainty on the
questions just raised. If this is to be nothing but legalized vengeance,
we shall be back to the seventeenth century days when the English
political statemen lost their heads as well as their political offices and
we shall approximate the unfortunate tradition of "ins and outs" in Latin
America. 2
The profoundly significant question, however, is whether, if the Allied
powers have deliberately chosen to adopt new standards by which to
judge aggression, they will so organize international society that those
standards will continue to apply. Justice Jackson's statement reveals
perhaps the most potentially far-reaching political mutation of modern
history, but mankind must give long and earnest thought to the full
implications of the step and to the methods by which the new United
Nations will insure an efficient form of government to carry out the
necessary functions of rule making, rule administering, rule interpreting
and the maximum of order which may be described as a police function
on an international scale. I propose to examine these four functions and
to indicate their bearing upon the national political systems of the
2, "We must not use the forms of judicial proceedings to carry out or
rationalize previously settled political or military policy. . . . There are
certain things you cannot do under the guise of the judicial trial." Mr.
Justice Jackson, The Rule of Law Among Nations (1945) 31 A. B. A. J.
292. (The report that Justice Jackson has proposed the substitution of a
younger member of the Krupp family for another member as a defendant
in the Nuremburg trials gives occasion for profound concern that the above
statement is being thrown into the discard. The report has been denied,
however.)
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members of the United Nations. But two preliminary observations
of a general nature must be made if we are to estimate aright the full
magnitude of the task ahead.

V. THE BRmAXDOWN or SEvElAL SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

In the first place we witness the breakdown of a number of systems
of international relations. I have already referred to the eclipse of the
Catholic medieval system 5 by the modern western theory of the sovereign state with its accompanying systems of international relations.
This latter system which emerged in the seventeenth century and developed to its fullest extent during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the course of this period came into contact with and vanquished
two other systems of "international" relations based upon very different premises. I refer to the Chinese and the Moslem systems. The
former had for many centuries governed the relations of China with
a number of surrounding people, Manchuria, Tibet, Nepal, Burma,
Annam and communities of lesser importance. It was not based upon
the Western idea of the state at all, nor did it admit the doctrine of the
legal equality of states. The clash between the Western system and
the Chinese cannot be described at length here, although it constitutes
an absorbingly interesting chapter in the history of human institutions.
Suffice it to say that what Western writers call the suzerainty regime
of China succumbed to the sovereignty regime of the imperialist powers
of the West. 2
I
So with the Moslem word. 27 Here religion and not law based upon
secular rules and power was the binding force, and it was not possible to
reconcile the resultant form of society with the Western concepts.
35For the Catholic theory of International Relations, see Carl Conrad
Eckhardt, op. ct.; Jom EpPSTEIN, THE CATHOLIC TRTIoN or THE LAW Or

NATIONS, London, 1935; JAEs BROWN SCOTT, THE CATHOLIC CoNcErnoN OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1934; A. C. F. BEALES, TE CATHOLiC CmmcH AND INTmNATIONAL ORDER, Penguin, 1941.
20 For Chinese theories of International Relations: M. F. NELSON, KoREA
AND THE OLD ORDER IN EASTERN ASIA, Louisiana State University Press, 1945;
H. M. VINACKE, A HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST IN MODERN TnIMES, F. S. Crofts,
1941; H. B. MORSE and H. F. MACNAIR, FAR EASTERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1931; Sm CHaLES BELL, TIBET, PAST AND FuT RE,
Oxford University Press, 1924; W. S. A. PoET, CHINESE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY,
A. A. Knopf, 1928; OwEN LATTimORE, THE MONGOLS OF MANCHUaA, John
Day, 1934.
27 For the clash between Western international organization and Moslem
civilization, see: A. J. ToYmNE and K. P. KnmrwooD, TURKEY, C. Scribner's
Sons, 1927; T. W. ARNOLD, TnE CALIPxATE, Oxford University Press, 1924;
MAJIm KADUR, THE LAw or WAR AND PEACE IN ISLAm, Luzac & Co., London,
1940; NAsim SOUSA, THE CAPITULATORY REomm OF TURKEY, Johns Hopkins
Press, 1933; HAs KonN, A HISTORY OF NATIONALISM IN THE ORIENT, Harcourt,
Brace & Co., 1929 (a German edition of this work appeared in Berlin in
1928); ORIENT AN OCCIDENT, John Day, 1934; NATIoNALrsm AND IMPERIALISm

IN THE HITHER EAST, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1932; REUBEN LEVy, AN INT o-

DUCTION TO TE SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM, Williams and Norgate, 1931-33, 2 vols.;

D. S. MARGorouTH, MOHAmuvmDANxS,

Home University Library, 1936. The

MosruM WORLD and IsLAMIc REV=w are two valuable journals.
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Turkey, for example, when it became a member of the European concert,
created many problems because the Sultan, a Caliph of the Moslem
world, was head of the Faithful whose members lived in countries which
were ruled by other political powers. The Turkish ruler could use
religion in those areas to influence his position as a member of the
Western political systems, and often created serious complications.
But the Moslem and the Chinese political organizations, which, in
addition to the philosophical or religious principles, were based on a
great degree of local life of an agricultural or pastoral character, could
not withstand the power of the new industrialism of the West. Consequently, after a period of resistance, both the Far East and Middle
East began to "modernize" by adopting, not without opposition on
the part of the conservative minded and much social and political confusion, the patterns of the victorious invaders from Great Britain,
France, Germany, Holland and the United States. Democracy, industry,
education, nationalism and the modern state were taken over at varying rates.
Unfortunately neither the imperialist Western powers nor the reformers in the Orient realized that the modem civilization of the Occident contained serious contradictions which became more ominous as
the twentieth century proceeded. For a short time the modern national
state proved to be a suitable framework for the effective organization
of the new social, scientific and economic forces which were emerging;
democracy and nationalism seemed to be different aspects of the same
great movement towards Freedom and Welfare. But not for long.
Soon the modern state (and its psychological counterpart, nationalism)
conflicted with the expansive field of industry and science. The Peace
Treaties of 1919-20 illustrate the great tragedy of attempting to enshrine
the principles of sovereignty and nationalism in an intimately interdependent world. Sooner or later something had to give way--either
men would attempt to thrust their major life forces into a national
mould, or they would recognize that the modern state is a relative instrument and not something to erect into an object of political worship.
The West is now in the process of clarifying its thinking and its emotions on these fundamental issues. Intellectually and from experience
it is learning the costliness of persisting in the thought-and-behavior
moulds of the nineteenth century and of erecting an instrument of
strictly relative utility into an object of superstitious devotion. But
matters of faith die hard, and nationalism and sovereignty still call
for the major responses of the mass of Western people, even though
most of the nations lie in ruins.
Now the Middle and Far East have accepted many of these national
ideals; indeed they are in the process of encouraging and enforcing
them precisely at the time when they are proving a broken reed in the
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home continents of their original propounders. And this fact gives a
tragic aspect to the new Orient-will it repeat the errors of the West
and adopt the sovereign patterns (even though modified to suit their
native environment) which are failing before its very eyes.
But the modern state idea, and its emotional accompaniment, though
triumphant in the Orient, has received a triple challenge within the last
generation. The Russian Revolution of 1917 introduced a new theory
of international relations in which the Western theory of international
law (being the rules regulating the conduct of independent sovereign
states) has been superseded by a theory which subordinates political
sovereignty to economic (and later, it is true, to political and military)
factors. Without examining the question in detail here, one can assert
that the Soviet theory of international relations does not square with
that held up to now by modem Western nations.28 And we have still
to see whether or not the Russians have not more clearly seen the
nature of the modem political problem of the relation of nations to
economic life and organization than have most of us.
The second challenge was the Nazi theory of international relations
based upon race and geopolitics in which the superior race and not
independent and legally equal sovereign powers was to be the organizing principle. 29 The third challenge came from the Japanese doctrine
of the Kingly Way and the New Order in Asia which also rejected the
Western orthodox political doctrines. The last two theories have
received what we hope is their deadly blow, for they were inherently
unsound.
The question, the all-important question, which now confronts us
is whether the Soviet and Western systems of international relations
can be harmonized into a more comprehensive system, a synthesis
which may embrace what some people have believed to be contradictory
principles. The answer will depend upon three factors: (1) The extent
to which the two systems will recognize their inadequacies and look
forward to finding newer and more adequate solutions to the unprec.8 T. A. TARAcouzIo, THE SovET UNIoN AND INERwATIoNAL LAW, Macmillan Co., 1935; InternationalCooperation of the U. S. S. R. in Legal Matters
(1937) 31 AM. J. I-r. L. 55-65; Charles Prince,The U. S. S, R. and International Organization (1942) 36 AM. J. IT, L. 425-45; Rudolf Schlesinger,
Recent Developments in Soviet Legal Theory (1942) 6 MOD. L. REV. 21-38;
Charles Prince, The Evolution and Crisis in Soviet Jurisprudence (1945)
31 A. B. A. J. 553-57 gives a brief summary of recent developments in the
broad field; H. M. Hazard, Cleansing Soviet International Law of AntiMarxist Theories (1938) 32 AM. 3. INT. L. 244-252.
20 For National Socialist theories of international law and organizations:
ADorr ETE, MEIN KA-mer; V. L. Gott, National Socialist Theory of International Law (1938) 32 Am. J. INT. L. 704; Gerhart Niemeyer, International
Law and Social Structure (1940) 34 A_. J. INT. L. 393ff.; Andrew Gyorgy,
The Application of German Geopolitics, Geosciences (1943) 37 Am. POL.
Sc. REv. 677-86; J. H. HERz, The National Socialist Doctrine of International
Law and Problems of International Organization (1939) 54 POL. Sci. Q.
536-552; L. Preuss, National Socialist Conceptions of International Law
(1939) 33 AM. POL. Scm Rzv. 594-609.
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edented problems which are emerging; (2) The extent to which all
nations will correctly and quickly evaluate the significance of the robot
bomb, the atomic bomb, the long-range plane, the cooperative effort
required in reconstruction, and the generally heightened interdependence
of the modern world. These events will themselves force a realization
of new methods, but whether they will do so quickly enough will depend
in large measure upon the open-mindedness, the intelligence and the
capacity to enlarge our concepts of national self-interest; if sentimentality stands in the way of seeing the new tasks ahead, nations will destroy
themselves in the name of national patriotism; (3) The extent to which
nations realize the need of gearing their local and national institutions
to the new world requirements and of providing the effective instruments of government internationally into which the local and national
institutions may fit.
VI. THE NEED

OF INTERNATIONAL

AGENCIES

FOR MAINTAINING ORDER,

MAKING, ENFORCING AND INTERPRETING RULES

The second preliminary observation of a general nature concerns the
changing instruments of government which have developed during the
history of human society. In England, the King was supposed to be
the foundation of legislative, executive and judicial power. Indeed,
in early years, these functions were all exercised by the King in Council
-witness the challenging title of C. H. McIlwain's "The High Court
of Parliament." Gradually the growing complexity and the pressure
of business led to a differentiation of functions. The House of Lords and
the House of Commons emerged; the Common Law Courts challenged
the King's Courts; the King fought in Commons; Parliament enlarged
its powers; the Lower House became master; the Cabinet system
emerged. The police department grew, and in the nineteenth century
the civil service, as we know it, began its remarkable career. It would
take undue space to describe these changes in detail and to review other
changes which occurred in the United States and elsewhere. But certain
recent developments should be stressed in order clearly to bring out
the point that change, experimentation, and uncertainty characterize
the political life, institutions, and values within the nations of the victorious Allies, and from these we may draw inferences having significance for the wider field of international law and government.
Parliament and Congress have handed over a great deal of quasilegislative power to subordinate agencies. Indeed the volume of delegated legislation far exceeds the amount of statute. Executive bodies
have taken over a great deal of quasi-judicial power. Courts have
become more specialized-juvenile courts, traffic courts, courts of
claims being outstanding examples. Federalism has passed into a stage
of peculiar complexity; no longer will the simple formula state versus
federal government suffice to describe the process-for federal grants-
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in-aid, inter-state conferences of governors, executive officials, and
professional bodies, regional projects like TVA, CVA, etc., cooperation
of civic agencies With state and federal goverments have all developed
as part response to the quest for more effective instruments of government. Demands have been voiced, freely for a reorganization of
Congress-the committee system, the seniority rule, the lack of sufficient party responsibility, and so on. Pressure groups, vocational
representation, public opinion polls, radio and the movies in turn add
their contributions as well as their problems.
These and other examples which might be adduced show that the
simple three-fold division of legislative, executive and judiciary will no
longer suffice to give an accurate picture of national governments today.
We need to keep in mind a much more complex and changing and
dynamic picture if we would not sacrifice accuracy to inert mental
stereotypes. Similarly we should beware of over-simplifying the structure of the emerging world organization and avoid trying to apply
in over-rigid fashion the categories just mentioned.
For example, treaties may or may not be regarded as international
"legislation" or "quasi-legislation," 80 but that we are in the process
of evolving more intricate methods of rule-making there can be little
doubt. The forms may vary considerably. The basic treaty may only
see the general outlines; a commission or committee meeting periodically may adopt more detailed rules; while a small executive committee may be entrusted with the duty of legislating on a still more
detailed scale, as will be illustrated later. Moreover, we are seeing
the development of what may be described as functional rather than
over-all or horizontal international rule-making bodies-a contrast to
the national picture where, except in dictator countries, the overall
legislation still makes the laws. The international society especially
may be expected to create new forms of governments if the recent experience within nations and also the developments in the relations
between nations furnish any reliable ground for judgment at this point.
And we should be on our guard against unduly arguing by analogy
from the past as does Professor Hans Kelsen, 31 who claims that, because
0

GIL, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, Oxford University Press,
1937, denies that treaties make international law. Judge Manley 0. Hudson
takes the opposite viewpoint, in INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION (Vol. 1, Introduction; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1931; and Vol. V,
Introduction). In the seven volumes which cover the modern period up to
1937, Professor Hudson includes 505 instruments of a multipartite nature
which in his judgment indicates a "broad extension of international law."
3 TORSTEN

3lHANs

KELSEN, LAw AND PFAcE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Harvard

University Press, 1942; PEAcE THROUGH LAw, University of North Carolina
Press, 1944; and many articles in the learned journals. For criticism of
Kelsen's view see, inter alia, the reviews of Kelsen's volumes by Clyde
Eagleton. in (1942) 36 Am. J. INr. L. 513, and Frederick L. Schuman in
(1945) 39 Am . POL. Sci. REv. 169. The same general criticism may be
made of certain chapters of H. LAUTERPAcHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CoinmTu=y, Oxford University Press, 1933.
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courts preceded legislation within nations, so the same general pattern
should be planned internationally-that the development of international courts should precede international legislation. We have no reason to expect that international society has to go through the same
steps as national societies in the past any more than the oriental countries will have to proceed from candle to gas and electricity as we have
done. In modern times new methods may be adopted in different stages
and at different rates; some intervening steps important to older nations
may be relatively ignored by later nations facing basically different
problems.
For many centuries international law grew by custom since its main
scope comprised disputes arising from conflicting customs. Only when
society begins to change and especially to change at a rapid rate do
law-making agencies assume a great importance. Law then becomes not
merely a process by which the courts declare the meaning of rules but
also a process by which legislatures or other bodies make rules. Indeed,
one may say that in a rapidly changing age, the most creative aspects
of law are those which deal with the growing intricacy of making laws
and administering them.
VII. THE TREATY PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL "LEGISLATION"
In the absence of an international parliament, the quasi-legislative
functions were first formed by bilateral treaties between sovereign states
and occasionally multilateral treaties. With the coming of the twentieth
century and especially of the League of Nations (and now the United
Nations), however, multilateral treaties took on an ever widening scope
-witness the League of Nations Treaty Series and Judge Manley
Hudson's several volumes entitled InternationalLegislation.

The new problems which have arisen have demanded action on a
wider than national scale and to that degree have borne witness to the
need of international government. This international government will
need adequate agencies for maintaining order, for making rules, enforcing rules and interpreting rules. Up to now, international government
has been very weak in the primary sense of maintaining order, and
relative to the amount of legislation passed in the constituent members
of the society of nations, it has also been of limited extent. But, unless
international government becomes increasingly effective, law will become
less and less creative and will increasingly deal with remedial problems
created in large measure by a defective legislative process. As I have
attempted to point out in a previous issue of this Review,"2 unless inter32 Linden A. Mander, National Law and International Law (1944) 19

WASH. L. REV. 72-84. For the need of re-examining international law, see,

inter alia, H. W. Briggs, Re-examination of International Law (1942) 36
Am. J. INT. L. 637-40: ". . . a clarion call by American international lawyers

reaffirming the principles of the sanctity of treaties, the advocacy of international self-restraint, the adjustment of international disputes by peaceful
means .

.

. would be considerably less than useless ....

There is a surfeit
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national order becomes established on a more secure basis, we may
expect to see a decline of national "law" and an increase in executive
power. The reason is simple, namely the growth of certain problems
which cannot be ignored. In the nineteenth century, the Industrial
Revolution brought many problems of industrial regulation. In the
twentieth century, these problems have grown in scope and complexity
but they have been overshadowed by another problem, namely that of
maintaining world order and preventing the outbreak of war in an
age of the atomic bomb. Under these circumstances the process which
created a wider area of government in past centuries-namely the
modem state-has by reason of its claim to exclusive authority become
a principle of anarchy. How true this judgment is We may realize by
considering how impossible is the task confronting the small powers of
defending their sovereignty. The age of their sovereign independence
is gone, since the material instruments which science has discovered
have transcended their capacity to make these instruments or to defend
themselves from their operation. There exist today only three superpowers-France and China, although included in the Big Five, are
relatively a second class from the point of view of armed might. Even
Great Britain, one of the Big Three, trails, leaving the United States
and Soviet Union the two most powerful countries in the world. But
can these countries by the separate exercise of their sovereignty avert
their own catastrophe? He would be a bold man who would confidently answer "yes" in the light of the scientific discoveries of even
the last twelve months.'
The first problem then is the maintenance of international order,
the prevention of aggression. Unless men can satisfactorily resolve
this question, the rest of life becomes enslaved. A detailed analysis of
the San Francisco Charter and the conditions necessary to prevent a
relapse into a fatal balance of power struggle does not form part of
the present article which is concerned with recent developments and
proposals in international organization in the "legislative," "executive"
and "judicial" spheres.
We may expect that (except for possible world security arrangements) 8 3 "international legislation" will continue to be effected through
treaties and conventions since there appears to be little immediate hope
of any direct international legislation by a world parliament. Under the
of statements and manifestoes telling states what they ought to do.... It
seems of vital importance to study the relationship of international law to

international politics."
3 Assuming that agreement can be reached in strengthening the United
Nations Charter so as to provide for world control of atomic power, three
senators have introduced a Senate resolution providing for adherence of
the United States to a World State. However logical their stand, the present
indications suggest the continuance of treaty relations in most phases of
international life.
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circumstances improvements in the treaty and agreement process might
and should be made.
First, we may draw attention to a valuable proposal made by C.
Wilfred Jenks, legal adviser of the International Labor Office of an
international legislative drafting bureau. He points out that faulty
draftsmanship of treaties constitutes a serious defect in the present
international setup and that the "standard of draftsmanship of most
of the instruments produced by League of Nations conferences has
been very uneven." An International Parliamentary Counsel's Office
could do three main things: (1) Prepare and keep up to date "the
somewhat elaborate reference books" which are necessary in the complex legal systems of the modern world. The works of reference would
include "(a) a manual of rules of style, (b) a manual of common forms
for standard articles, (c) a subject index of the contents of multipartite
instruments, (d) a multilingual glossary of translations used in multipartite instruments consisting of versions in two or more languages,
(e) an index of terms defined in multipartite instruments, and (f) a list
'34
of short titles of multipartite instruments.
(2) This Office should assist in preparing drafts of multipartite
instruments. Drafting, as every attorney knows, involves a high degree
of specialized skill and such an office would make available to international conferences the services of those whose special training will
have fitted them for this task. (3) This Office should be empowered to
propose improvements in legislative technique; such a step will require
attention to both general instruments and also to many small details
which always exist in legal relations of an international character.
Judge Manley 0. Hudson makes an important suggestion that where
multilateral conventions are signed setting forth the text "of a uniform
law to be incorporated in the national legislation of the states which
are parties," either a general international agency could be given competence to deal with questions of uniform interpretation or a special
chamber could be created within the Permanent Court of International
Justice. The problem has risen especially in the commercial field, but
it has a wider application and resembles that which obtains in the
United States where difficulties ensue when uniform acts are passed
by the states because of the absence of a tribunal clothed with power
"to reconcile divergent state interpretations of such acts." A number
of international administrative bodies exist which may give "persuasive
interpretations," (bodies such as the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union and the International Labor Organization which
deal with postal and labor matters), and the Permanent Court of
International Justice may give decisions in disputes brought before it
34C. Wilfred Jenks, The Need for an International Legislative Drafting
Bureau (1945) 39 AM. J. INT. L. 174.
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by two or more states, which, however, do not have binding effect upon
states not parties to the dispute. These methods do not appear to be
comprehensive enough, and the suggestion offered by Judge Hudson
appears to be worthy of serious consideration.8"
If international "government" is to keep pace with growing needs,
the process will have to be speeded up by effectively dealing with the
long delays now occasioned by the process of treaty ratification. All
should agree that the bewildering complexity of international relations
makes a certain cumbersomeness inevitable, but something is radically
defective when it will take perhaps more than two years to set in
motion the financial organization provided for in the Bretton Woods
Agreement. The world desperately needs a rapid restoration of currency stability as well as an institution for capital investment which
can get under way in a very short time. Otherwise economic chaos may
spread in many parts of the world, not the least in those areas which
the victorious Allies have delivered from the German and Japanese governments. It will, indeed, be grim irony if the sole effect of delivering
Europe and Asia from the dictatorships should be to present the delivered peoples with a freedom of starvation and nothing more. Unless
more rapid action is possible, the United Nations is threatened with
something more than a breakdown of constitutional structure.
Francis 0. Wilcox has pointed out the tendency for ratification of
treaties to take longer in recent years than several decades ago,2 8 This
unfortunate result has come about for the following reasons: (1) The
growing amount of governmental control and regulation which of itself
throws a greater burden upon government and slows it up; (2) The
democratic process makes for discussion, and some cynics would say
for useless talk betraying little more than organized sectional interests;
(3) The necessity of national implementation, often involving considerable sums of money such as the two billion dollars (later over three
billion) asked for by UNRRA from the various nations-members; (4)
The growing expense involved in international "legislation" to raise
social standards; unemployment and sickness insurance, medical insurance, etc., place heavy burdens upon the exchequer and naturally the
national governments require time in order to adjust these demands
to the national budget although, as I have pointed out elsewhere, "one
must add that all the costs of the internationally proposed social and economic reforms would not approach within measurable distance the appalling expenditure at present incurred in competitive armaments." 7
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Earlier in this article reference was made to the loose drafting of the
international conventions. This factor, in the word of Francis Wilcox,
causes states to hesitate "to assume the obligations imposed until they
have a definite assurance of what they really are. Unfortunately there
is no easy method of obtaining official interpretations of questionable
38
phrases or clauses."1
Several proposals have been made to speed up ratification. A League
of Nations committee in 1930 proposed that states which had failed to
ratify provide the League with the reasons for their delay; that states
undertake to consider a convention providing for ratification within a
stated time; and even that certain international agreements might be
adopted without process of ratification.
Professor Noel Baker has suggested that ratification should automatically follow unless states specifically reject a treaty signed by the
representatives, this rejection to take place within a given time limit.3 9
G. E. Toulmin has proposed that ratification take place in the international conference itself; 40 Eagleton and others have even asked whether
it would not be desirable to eliminate the ratification process altogether.
Clearly these proopsals would involve a material change in the center
of gravity in the relation of national states to international organizations.
(To be continued)

Il WiLcox,

op. cit. supra 115-16.

29 P. J. Noel Baker, The Codification of International Law (1924-5)
BRr. Y. B. INT. L. 63.
10 G. E. Toulmin, The Barcelona Conference on Communications and
Transit and the Danube Statute (1922-3) BRrr. Y. B. INT. L. 178.

